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THE SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF LAW
"Proconsul naturali acquitate motus omnibus cognatis promittit
bonorum possessionem, quos sanguinis ratio vocat ad hereditatem,
licet jure civili deficiant."
GAius, libro sexto decirno ad edictumn provinciale.2
"General propositions do not decide concrete cases. The decision
will depend on a judgment or intuition more subtle than any articulate major premise."
Mr. Justice HoLME-, in Lochner v. New York, (19o4), 198 U.
S. 76.
T is not the purpose of this paper to essay a definition of either
of the formidable words in the title. The object is rather to
call attention away from the metaphysical question, what is
law? to the sociological question, how may we best attain justice in
the administration of law? and, by the aid of some examples from
history and comparative law, to justify as legal and constitutional
the sociological method of interpretation. That such justification
is necessary is evident from the fact that although the dictum of
Mr. Justice. HOLMES in the dissenting opinion in Lochner v. New
York, cited supra, was practically adopted by the United States
Supreme Court in Muller v. Orego-, 2 in which Mr. Justice BREWER
gave the apparently unanimous conclusion of the court, nevertheless, in the case of Bunting v. Oregonil on a similar state of facts,
a dissent was expressed by Mr. Justice WHITE, who was on the
bench when Muller v. Oregon was decided, and by Mr. Justice
VAN DEVANTER and Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS, who were later
added, while Mr. Justice BRANDEIS took no part in the consideration and decision of the case. It would therefore seem that only a
4
bare majority of that court is of the same express opinion still.
I Dig. 38, 8, 2. "The proconsul influenced by natural justice promised possession
of property to all who by reason of blood kinship are called to the inheritance, although
by the civil law they have no claim."
2 (1908), ao8 U. S. 412.
3 (1g7), 243 U, S. 426.
4 The first three justices simply registered their dissent without an opinion. Their
reason for dissent is, therefore, not evident. It is, of course, well known what the opinion
of Mr. justice Brandeis is on the question of the validity of the sociological method,
from his brief in Muller v. Oregon. Possibly it is because of his connection as counsel
with past litigation that he refrains from participation in Bunting v. Oregon. In the
case of Merrick v. Halsey Co., (i9i6), 242 U. S. 587 the court said that the form of the
constitution is not "so rigid as to make government inadequate to the changing conditions
of life." Mr. Justice McReynolds dissented from this opinion.
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There has, too, been considerable discussion of the principle of
these decisions in our legal periodicals, the most notable of which
is perhaps that by Professor Kales in the last volume of the YALE
LAW JOURNAL 5 and some caustic criticisms of the method, offered
by lawyers and judges.'
It is a far cry from the Age of the Antonines to the first years of
the Twentieth Century, but the jurisconsult of the earlier period
has some remarkable resemblances to the justice of the later time,
and the statements of the principle of legal interpretation from the
two, placed at the beginning of this paper, go far toward proving
the philosophic assumption, that while rules of law may change with
the varying circumstances of time and place, the principles of justice or at least the methods of attaining justice through law remain
the same.
Gaius, although the greatest of Roman jurists, probably did not
have the jus publice respondendi which would have put the stamp
of supreme authority on what he said, and thus his statements had
exactly the same legal value as the utterance of our Justice of the
Supreme Court when speaking in dissent; i. e., they were law only
in so far as they were in conformity with right reason, that recta
ratio which Cicero says is the essence of all law. But this expression of right reason afterwards received, in either case, the stamp
of sovereignty; that of Gaius, by incorporation in the enacted law
of the Digest, that of Holmes, in the unanimous opinion of the
Court in Muller v. Oregon.
The principle of interpretation laid down by Gaius was sociological. He was dealing with the final stage of development of a rule
of inheritance that went back to the primitive period in the Roman
*26
Yale Law Jour. 519-549. "Due Process," the Inarticulate Major Premise and
the Adamson Act. In 29 Harv. L. Rev. 683-699, there is a very scholarly and appreciative criticism of "The Constitutional Opinions of Justice Holmes", by Professor Frank
furter, which shows that Holmes' dissent in Lochner v. New York is an expression of
his settled judicial policy. There is also a full discussion by Professor Frankfurter of
the cases leading up to the decision in Muller v. Oregon, in 29 Harv. L. Rev. 353-373.
6"The great discussion going on as to free judicial decision in the interpretation of
statutes is a present professorial agitation which would leave nothing of the general effect
of a statute but all to the judgment of he judge." * * * "What the professors coolly propose to the judges is the commission of impeachable offenses." Dr. John M. Zane in
"German Legal Philosophy", 16 Mich. L. Rev. 3o9.
"There is a visible tendency at the moment to subject this country to an alien philosophy of law. It is openly asserted by politicians and philosophers that the develop.
ment of the common law is not keeping pace with modern thought, and that the common
lawyer has too long neglected those higher conceptions which a modern philosophy of
the German socialists alone unfolds." - - * "Our present law is in its essence incomparable and inimitable." Judge Robert Ludlow Fowler in "The New Philosophies of
of Law", 27 Harv. L. Rev. 718.
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state. The Law of the Twelve Tables had laid down the rule that
in case there was no agnatus (descendant through male stock) of
an intestate, the gentiles (collaterals of the male stock) should take.
The effect of this rule was, that if A had a son and a daughter and
each married and had a son, the grand-son through the son would
take A's estate while the grand-son through the daughter would be
cut out. Worse than this, in the absence of an agnate grand-son, the
agnate collaterals, the gentiles, would take, to the exclusion of the
cognate grand-son. This rule, however, was quite in accordance
with the spirit of the times in the middle of the fifth century before
Christ and there is no doubt that to the Decemvirate, who formulated the rule, it was meant to accomplish just this purpose.
The Law of the Twelve Tables is the first great constitutional document of the Roman state that was passed for the purpose of stressing one side of the ever-present legal antinomy with which we must
deal in our pursuit of justice. Law must be certain, otherwise no
man can know until he tries how his case is going to be judged. But
on the other hand, law must grow, in "ofder to meet the needs of a
constantly-though slowly-changing social order with its developing idea of right. This rule of preference for the agnatus was established by what in modem phraseology we should call a constitutional convention and should therefore, according to a theory of
interpretation still prevalent, be considered "immutable except when
changed in the manner therein prescribed." 8 But this emphasis on
the rights of the male stock became an anomaly in a more highly
civilized society and the rule, which in theory was inflexible, had to
change. The method by which the change was brought about is
characteristic of the legal-mindedness of the Romans. It would
seem that some unknown praetor, using a legal fiction-a device by
which a change may be actually made in the spirit of the law while
leaving the form apparently unchanged--announced that whenever
this question was presented in his court, he would treat the first
order of cognates as though they were agnates2 0 The final stage in
the change of the law by rational interpretation is shown in the citation from the Edictnm Provinciale cited above. It is stated that by
the jus civile the cognati have no rights in the property but that
the proconsul by an appeal to a- quitas naturalis gives to them their
T Si infestato noritur, cui su s heres nec escit, agnatus proximus feaniliam habeto.
Si agnatus nec escit, gentiles familiam habento. XII Tab. V. 3-5.
sCf. Borgnis v. Falk Co. (1911),

147

Wis. 368.

Barnes, J.

(Concurring in the de-

cision but disapproving of the theory of interpretation).
9 Maine, Ancient Law, p. 25.

10Gradatim outem adnittultur comgnati ad bonorumn possessionem: ut qui sunt primno
gradu, omnes shnul ad,nittuntur. Dig. 38, 8, 1, 1o.
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rights, causa corrigendi juris civilis. One may note the close parallelism of this judicial process to that of the sociological jurist in
the operation of "free judicial decision,""' to be discussed later.
If we confine our juridical process within the limits of strict
grammatical interpretation, The Law of the Twelve Tables excludes the cognates from the inheritance. It is quite as plain that
if we go no further than a logical interpretation, the authorities
who laid down the rule intended that the cognates should be excluded, but if, with the proconsul cited by Gaius, we go beyond the
inflexible letter of the law and the intent of the lawgivers of a remote past, to the sociological needs of the present, the demands of
the cognates are recognized as in accord with the current idea of
aequitas naturalis.1
Gaius has here described the final stage in the development of the
legal rule. In the primitive period of naive customary law the rule
had developed as a usage among the primitive patrician folk of the
Period of the Kings. Because of the demand that the law should
be written down and thus crystallized in final and unchangeable
form, the rule was published in the Twelve Tables as an authoritative expression of the law. But this rule is to be administered
by a legal tribunal. The demand for change is met, though grudgingly and slowly, by the awkward juridical device, the legal fiction:
the rule is unchanged but its application is extended. The last step
is taken in the Golden Age of Roman law when right reason has
full sway and the administration of law is controlled by the best
legal talent of a learned profession acting in accordance with the
dictates of "natural justice."
21Cf. Science of Legal fethod: Vol. 1X. The Legal Philosophy Series, particularly
the essays by G~ny, Erlich and Wurzel.
There is another striking application of this same process in the history of Roman
procedural law. The legis actiones had developed under the pontiffs and, as ecclesiastical
and therefore sacred utterances, they were assumed to be immutable. But they became
unsuitable for a more highly developed civilization because of their very immutability
and consequent narrowness of application. The praetor peregrinus by virtue of his
imperium [delegated sovereignty] substituted the written formula for the oral pleadings
of the legis actiones. Because of the flexibility of this reformed procedure the praetor
urbanus borrowed the formula for use in his court in place of the actio. This brought
the dispute between the pontiffs and the praetors to a head. Their differences were submitted to the people meeting in their legal assembly, which possessed the same sovereign
power that belongs theoretically to the English Parliament. By the enactment of the
Lex Aebutia and later of the Lex Julia this dispute was settled in favor of the more
liberal procedure because that brought the procedural law into harmony with the sociological needs of the more highly devcloped state.
12Doubtless Gaius would be much surprised to find that he had anticipated the
sociological jurists by more than seventeen hundred years, but it is evident that aequitas
naturalis here means the equitable doctrine of the lime of Gaius and not that of the
time of the Decemvirate.
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It is characteristic of what Dean Pound so aptly calls a "mechanical jurisprudence"'13 to stress the fixity rather than the flexibility
side of our juristic antinomy. While Roman juristic thinking was
still rational rather than mechanical, Gaius had laid down another
rule of interpretation to be followed when there is a conflict of authority. He says,' 4 "If the opinions [of the jurists] agree, their decision has the force of a statute; but if they disagree, the judex
may follow whichever opinion he pleases." This simply states the
established law that the responsa prudentiumn are the law of the
state, depending for their force upon the jus respondendi, conferred upon selected jurists from the time of Augustus.15 If they are
unanimous, there is no chance for conflict of authority, but, if they
disagree, and here is the significance of the passage, the judexin this instance the juryman rather than the judge-is to have complete "judicial freedom of decision."
In marked contrast with this rational rule of a reasonable age is
the one laid down in the period of decadence.10 "But where different opinions are produced, let the greater number of authors prevail. Or, if the number should be equal, the authority of that side
should have precedence, on which Papinian may appear, the man of
overtowering ability; who prevails against one but yields to two."
This is majority rule in its baldest form. The so-called reason is to
be found by the simple device of counting noses, with the slight concession in favor of Papinian-the New York or Massachusetts
court of his day-that he counts more than one though less than
two. It must be said in behalf of this oft quoted and frequently
maligned "Rule of Citations of Valentinian" that in a later clause it
makes the same concession to reason as is made in the rescript of
Hadrian ,as cited by Gaius, supra, to the effect, that when the opinions of those whose authority is of equal value are cited, then the
balanced opinion (inoderatio) of the judge is to decide. Unfortunately the rational part of the edict was rarely appealed to, but the
rule was applied as a mechanical device and as though it were a
mathematical axiom which announced an ultimate unchangeable
truth. In the succeeding ages of intellectual feebleness this mechanical rule of interpretation being easy to apply, was much oftener followed than the rational one laid down by Gaius and adopted
u 8 Columbia Law Review, 6os.
-

14Institutes 1, 7.
35Primus divus Augustus, ut major juris ouctoritas haberetur, constituit, ut ex
auctoritate ejus responderent. Dig. 1, 2, 2, 49.
uCod. Theod. 1, 4, 3.
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by Justinian, who states the rule of reason in its most unequivocal
terms.1 7
It must be acknowledged that the Roman jurists had a much
easier task than has the American justice in squaring their theory
of interpretation with the law and constitution of their state. Although our division of the functions of government into executive,
legislative and judicial is as old as Aristotle, 8 the Romans apparently never recognized it as a fundamental classification of governmental powers, though they worked out experimentally a very
effective system of checks and balances for the operation of the
different functions of delegated sovereignty, by the progressive
subdivision of the magistracy and by the growth in the powcrs,
first, of the primary assemblies with sovereign legislative authority
and, later, by the indirect influence of the senatorial order. Because of this difference between the constitutional principles of the
Roman state and our own constitutional provisions, the Roman jurists seem never to have thought of interpretation of law as being
in any way involved with the other question of the limitations on
the powers of the executive, the legislature or the judiciary. It
should be noted, however, that if we once admit that interpretation of law in any civilized society belongs to the most highly trained members of a learned profession acting in accordance with the
right reason of the time and place, it makes no difference whether
we find this class in a legislative committee, a bench of judges, or a
magistrate learned in the law and endowed with the power of interpretation.
This difficult question of hermeneutics, as to how a legal doctrine may be retained as the same principle and yet expanded or
changed so as to meet a new situation, re-appears in the revised Roman law of the period of the Renaissance. After the Glossators19
had gone to seed on their method of merely verbal or grammatical interpretation of the ancient texts of the law, which were considered immutable, and capable only of explanation but not of development, the Commentators carried on their work by the introduction of a dialectic method which elaborated the law through log'I Nemo jude.r vel arbiter existhnet neque consultationes, quas non rite judicatas esse
putaverit, sequendu, * * * (cion nion ea'emplis sed legibus judicandunt est,) * * * sed
oinnes judices nostros veritatem et legum et usitilac sequi vestigia sancimus.
Cod.
7, 45, 13.

1. Politics 6, 14, T. Maine in his Popular Government, p. 219 and notes, gives an
account of the modern history of this device showing that Madison was influenced by
Montesquieu.
1 See Calisse's History of Italian Law, translated in the Continental Legal History
Series, Vol. 1, p. 137, ff.
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ical reasoning and discussion. The later Glossators had "developed the rule of taking for law whatever some authority had once asserted and of deciding (when there were opposing opinions on the
record) by the number of opinions on one side or the other."
Among the Commentators, who succeeded the Glossators, Bartolus
attained rank similar to that held by Papinian in the classic Roman
law, but his decadent followers embraced in its entirety the doctrine of communis opinio or weight of opinion, and thus they,
too, were landed in the same morass of legal contradictions as were
the Roman lawyers of the period of decadence by their slavish use
of Valentinian's Law of Citations and as are the courts of the
present day that rely upon the "weight of authority" or "majority
opinion." The Humanists who succeeded the Commentators corrected their short-comings by an appeal to an "inarticulate major
premise" drawn from the principles of natural law as then understood, which was assumed to contain "the dictates of right reason
which tells whether men's actions conform to justice." Although
this "natural law," to which appeal was made, has since been shown
to be a somewhat fanciful concept and is now decidedly out of style
among legal philosophers, nevertheless, the method of expansion of
law by the Humanists through an appeal to the current sense of
justice is the same as that of our present day sociological jurists.
English jurists have never troubled themselves particularly about
the theoretical validity of this method of interpretation, probably
because it has been practically taken as a matter of course. In the
first place, they have not had before them the apparent barrier of
the sharp segregation of functions that is implied by our constitutional separation of governmental powers between the executive,
the legislature and the courts, and the further, gratuitous, assumption that the interpretative function belongs exclusively to the one
or the other of these departments. In the second place, the growth
of equity along side of the common law has been a constant reminder that there is always an appeal from the rigid letter of the
law to the principles of bona fides and bona conscientia, which are
in accord with the current sense of justice. Indeed, one of the best
definitions of equity by an English jurist 2 is an express recognition
of the validity .of the sociological method of interpretation of law.

30"The

judicial modification or supplementing of existing rules of law by reference

to current morality."

Clark, Practical Jurisprudence, p. 373.

The sociological jurisprudence of today may be looked at as a new equity or at
least as an equitable appeal to a present-day, living and growing bona consccnaa. The
criticism of sociological equity rather out-does Selden's reference to the equity of his
day as a 'roguish thing, measured according to the conscience of him that is Chancellor,

and as that is larger or narrower, so is equity' (Cf. note 6, ante).
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Then, too, the great statutes, such as De Donis and the Statute of
Uses, which have been worked into the web and woof of our Common Law, have been so incorporated and in most instances completely transformed by this very process.
The nineteenth century codes of the Continental European states,
beginning with the great French Civil Code have attempted different solutions of the problem of interpretation. Article 5 of the
French Code 21 forbids judges to pass judgment which in our
phraseology would make a binding precedent, but a preceding article imposes a penalty upon judges who refuse to give a decision on
the pretext that the law does not cover the case.2 2 It would seem
that the combined effect of these two provisions would be to force
the exercise of free judicial decision of any particular case in which
it was called for, but that such decision would not add to the body
of legal principle. Later legislation, however, would seem to give
the Court de Cassation,by repeated decisions on the point, the power to crystallize the principle into "a rule of guidance for the particular case. ' 23 "But there are still from time to time declaratory
laws (lois interpretatives) brought forward by the government in
order to put an end to uncertainties in the practical application of
law, sometimes on its own initiative, sometimes upon petition." 2 4
This apparently leaves the last word with the legislature and not
with the judiciary. However, G6ny says that free discretion belongs to the judiciary and that "it has a broader sweep where it can
be exercised outside of all formal legal sources. ' 25
The French Revolution established liberty and equality as basic
categories of law and justice. Our own Declaration of Independence and various bills of rights have adopted these as fundamental
principles of administrative justice. It is therefore no accident that
the discussion of the interpprtation of "Liberty" has occupied the
jurists of the Continent and the justices of our courts during the
past century.
The French Civil Code, Translated into English by E. Blackwood Wright, LL.D.
Op. cit. Art. 4.
m Op. cit. Art. s, Note (c).
"Planiol, Trait6 6lmentaire de droit civil, I, s. 2zo, translated by Pound, at p. 2o,
in his Readings in Roman Law, to which I am indebted for preceding references.
' Science of Legal Method. Modern Legal Philosophy Series, Volume IX, p. 4.
This work contains a number of essays by Continental jurists: French, German and
Austrian, and by American jurists: Pound, Freund, Wigmore, Kocourek and Alvarez,
of Chile. All discuss the general theme of the interpretative function of the courts.
This paper began as a review of the Science of Legal Method. As it grew to large for
that purpose the review proper was published in 16 Mich. L. Rev 463 and the development of the principle in our own courts was more carefully worked out and brought
into relation with the manifestations of it in classical Roman and mediaeval law.
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The obligation of private contract is guaranteed by the French
Civil Code, 28 but Giny says that here as everywhere else the formal
rules are not sufficient for the administration of the law in all cases,
and by taling advantage of the method of free judicial decision
we "may and should establish new rules to supply what is omitted
in the statutes and the customary law in order to put into full ef2T
fect the principle of the autonomy of the will of the parties.1
But it is evident that if the will of the parties has found in the law
no set formula which it could use, it must have proceeded in accordance with the 'moral, psychological, economic, in brief, the
28
social circumstances under which it tried to accomplish its aim.'
It follows therefore that we must cease t6 look at a contract solely
from the standpoint of the "psychological idea of agreement" but
will have to interpret it in its relation to all the facts of the life of
society. The will of the parties is not then the sole criterion of interpretation, for while the greatest possible satisfaction must be
given to the desires of the parties yet they must be made consistent
with the social purposes of mankind, and in the administration of
the law there must be a "judicious comparison of all the interests
involved, with a view to balancing them against each other-in conformity with the interests of society." "Thus the courts are led
without exceeding the well known limits of private law, whenever
they have no formal guidance furnished by statute or established
custom, to search for light among the social elements of every kind
that are the living force behind the facts they deal with, if they
29
wish to proceed with any assurance of being right."
At the beginning of his paper on Methods of Judicial Thinking,
Wurzel says that he proposes to treat the subject not from a philo0
He is dealing with the
sophical but from a juridical standpoint.
of the Science of
chapters
other
the
in
found
problem
practical
Legal Method, namely, the extension of statutory law by proper
methods of juridical thinking to meet new situations and establish
new rights. He, in common with all other continental jurists, starts
IFrench Civil Code, Sec. 1134. Agreements formed according to law bind those
who make them. * * * Agreements must be carried out in good faith. Sec. zis& In

construing agreements one must seek to ascertain what was the common intention of the

parties, rather than be tied down by the literal meaning of the terms used. The references to GOny are taken from the essay on judicial Freedom of Decision in the Science
of Legal Method. See note 25.
"7Science of Legal Method, p. 23.
2Thbid, p. 24.
" Ibid, pP. 38, 45.
00Ibid, pp. a$6- 4 23. The succeeding quotations are taken from various parts of this
essay.
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with the statute as a statement of the basic law of the state at the
time and in the place and environment of its enactment.
This basic law embodies a concept and it has been assumed that
juridical thinking consists (i) in an interpretation of the concept
expressed in the legal rule, (2) the reconstruction of the intention
of the legislator and (3) possibly in addition the employment of
analogies. Wurzel however gives us an ingenious elaboration of
these processes by which the central concept is carried out into the
surrounding penumbra of legal concepts. He calls this "projection"
and defines it as "the extension of a concept found in formulated law
to phenomena which were not originally contained in the concept, or
at least were not demonstrably a part of the group of images forming the concept, without at the same time changing the nature of
the concept as such." He would represent the concept graphically
not as a geometrical figure, but as a photograph with vague and
gradually diminishing outlines, so that one can not tell where the
picture proper ends and the background begins, but it is in this
back ground that the concept found in formulated law is projected
into the world of actual phenomena. Suppose a statute passed in
1700 imposes a tax on mills "run by machine power" Quaere: Does
it apply to steam or electric mills? If this law were to be interpreted by the first two rules laid down above it is plain that "machine power" could refer only to machines driven by wind or water.
It is equally evident that the legislators of i7oo could not have any
"intention" of taxing mills run by steam or electricity. But we
reach the conclusion by "projection" that the law imposes a tax
on mills of the modern type. "We attach the new phenomena to
the old concept as an integral part, although it was not originally
contained in it-in short we project the old concept into the new
phenomena," the connecting link being the "economic and physical
data which in the meantime had become part of the meaning of the
term 'machine' as used in ordinary language." It is by this device
that the legal system may adapt itself to the movements on the
shifting surface of social life. By means of projection, social influences find entrance into the body of the law and the rights and liabilities of parties are alvays to be determined "in accordance with
the notions of the present age, and never according to what the
legislator may have thought when the law was made." With proper training in the sociological method lawyers "will cease to conceive of the law as a mere naked command and learn to comprehend its nature as a social phenomenon."
It is evident that the same solution of the antinomy mentioned
above is suggested both by the French professor and the Austrian
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jurist, each working out from his national code and applying the
method to his own juristik environment. Kohler, the leading advocate of the sociological jurisprudence, has applied this method to
the interpretation of the German Civil Code. He lays down this
principle "Rules of law are not to be interpreted according to the
thought and will of the law-maker, but they are to be interpreted
as products of the whole people, whose organ the law-maker has
become."
In Dean Pound's article on Courts and Legislation we find the
principles of juridical thinking above outlined applied to our own
American law. He makes perfectly plain that this "relation of the
courts to legislation is neither a new question nor a local question'3
but he does not state in express terms that the solution suggested is
not "judicial legislation" but that the question is merely as to the
character and limits of the universally acknowledged power of the
judiciary to interpret the law. It is this apparently that the critics
have seized upon for such severe denunciation.
Most of the interpretation in the American courts is of the grammatical or logical type or of a combination of the two, but the more
liberal courts are beginning to recognize that the social needs to be
served by their decisions are quite within their competence. Perhaps no better way of comparing the two juridical methods can be
found than to consider the conflicting decisions of some of our
great courts on practically the same state of facts. The decisions
all involve the question of interpretation of the word "liberty" as
used in the Fourteenth Amendment to our Constitution.
The difficulties of liberal interpretation are greater under our
American system of government than on the Continent or in lrngland. According to the stock theory, the Continental codes can be
changed only by the legislative bodies that promulgated them. If
this theory were rigidly adhered to, interpretation could not go beyond the grammatical or logical stage; sociological interpretation
would be barred. Under our own system we have back of the statute a written constitution which is popularly supposed to be absolutely rigid, capable of change only by amendment, and this theory
of the Constitution seems to be still held by many lawyers and by
some respectable courts. This difficulty is not so acute in England
which, if it has a constitution at all, has2 one that in Bryce's phraseology is a flexible and not a rigid one.3 We also have the further
fact
*1Ibid. P. 204 Dean Wilmore savs in plain terms that "the iudiciary have in with
occupied themselves at all times with declarations of law independent of statute, i. e.,
xxx.
genuine legislation. Cf. Editorial Preface to the Science of Legal Method, p.
Con22Bryce, Studies in History and Jurisprudence, Essay III. Flexible and Rigid
stitutions.
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difficulty that our Constitution makes the cleavage between the legislative and the judicial function much more sharply defined and,
although Macybury v. Madison may have established that interpretation is a judicial function, the question as to what interpretation is and how far it may go, still arises to trouble us. The segregation of legislative from judicial functions and the enclosure of
each in air-tight compartments certainly makes for rigidity in the
administration of our laws.
Nevertheless in spite of these handicaps it may be shown that some of our courts, under what was
felt to be a compelling force of social need have surmounted the
difficulty.
It should be borne in mind that our conflict here is not between
the meaning of lex, enacted law, and jus, traditional law, nor is it
the other long discussed question as to the source of law, whether
sovereign power or natural growth, but it is the deeper antinomy
of fixity versus flexibility in law and the reconciliation of the two
in such a way as to secure the more perfect justice.
The provision of our Constitution that no State shall "deprive
any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law," 33
protects by constitutional provision, liberty to contract, just as the
French Civil Code 4 by statutory provision assures the obligation
of contract. The Constitution of the State of Illinois has a provision identical with that of the Constitution of the United States,
Amendment XIV, section I, above cited. The various interpretations of "liberty" and "due process" by our supreme courts show
that the problem of free judicial decision is the same in America
as in Continental Europe though probably more difficult of solution
with us.
In the case of Ritchie v. The People of the State of Illinois35 the
court rested its decision squarely on the proposition that in determining the meaning of the Constitution. as the fundamental law the
court may not go beyond the grammatical interpretation of the
words themselves and the intent of the framers of the instrument
at the time it was fashioned. An act of the legislature 6 said, "No
female shall be employed in any factory or workshop more than
eight hours in any one day." This provision was held unconstitutional and void because the legislature cannot "interfere with the
'*XIV,

Amend., See. x.

34 Cf ante, Note 26. It may be observed that the French Code guarantees the obligation of contract, thus making the code provision more closely analogous to that of
Art I, Sec. io of our Constitution than to Amend. XIV, Sec. x, but the principle involved in the interpretation under the Code is the same as that under the Constitution.

11 (1895), xs5 IlL. 98.
3' Laws of Illinois, 1893, Sec. 5.
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freedom of contract between the workman and the employer," nor
can the legislature "invade the rights of person and property under
the guise of a mere police regulation." The theory of interpretation apparently held by this court has been most clearly enunciated
"I regard our
in an opinion of the Wisconsin Supreme Court1
the manner
in
changed
when
except
constitutions as immtitable
therein prescribed. * * * To hold otherwise is to say that the
courts may change our fundamental laws. This would be a clear
usurpation of power never vested nor intended to be vested in the
courts, and one which was reserved to the people themselves."
The Illinois court decided that the Act of 1893, prohibiting the
employment of females in any factory or workshop for more than
eight hours a day was unconstitutional because it deprived the
woman of the "liberty" to make her own contract and the word
"liberty" was interpreted in accordance with the grammatical meaning of "freedom to act" and with reference to what the constitution
makers "intended" by its use. The question as to whether interneed not be conpretation was a judicial or a legislative function
8
that a statute
held
decision
later
sidered. The Illinois court in a
constitutional.
was
day
one
in
work
hours
limiting women .to ten
The court attempts to reconcile the two decisions by saying that
the Act of 19o9 showed on its face that it was "passed for the purpose of promoting the health of women" and was therefore justified under the police power; with the intimation that if the earlier
act had been a ten-hour law, the result in the earlier case might
have been different. It may also be significant that Mr., now justice, Louis Brandeis submitted a brief in the later case. Prior
York
to this later Illinois case the question had come up in the New
39
The
Court.
Supreme
States
United
the
in
and
Court of Appeals
exan
"is
bakers
for
law
ten-hour
a
that
decided
New York court
ercise of the police power of the legislature relating to the public
health and therefore violates no provision of the State or Federal
Constitutions." The United States Supreme Court held that there
was in this instance not a legitimate exercise of the police power
of the State and "under such circumstances the freedom of master
and employee to contract with each other

*

*

*

*

cannot be

prohibited or interfered with, without violating the Federal Constitution." There was a strong dissenting opinion in this case by Mr.
31 Borgnis v. Falk Co.. (xgx),

147 Wis. 368, Barnes, J.

but disapproving the theory of interpretation.

(concurring in the decision

Cf. n. 8, supra.

enact3 Ritchie v. WVayman, (191o), 244 Ill. 50o, establishing the validity of the
ment in Laws of z9o9, at p. 212.
Supreme
"People v. Lochner, (x9o4), 777 N. Y. 145. This case was taken to the

Court of the United States in Lochner v. New York, 398 U. S. 45.
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Justice HARLAN, with whom Mr. Justice WHiam
DAY concurred. Mr. Justice HoIms also wrote
ion in which occurs the statement cited at the
paper.
In 19o3 the legislature of the State of Oregon"

and Mr. Justice

a dissenting opinbeginning of this
passed a law pro-

viding: "That no female shall be employed in any * * * *
laundry * * * * more than ten hours during any one day."

The constitutionality of this law was called in question and, in
Muller v. Oregon,4' the United States Supreme Court decided that
the law was constitutional. An elaborate brief was submitted by
Mr. Louis Brandeis in this case, citing legislation in various States
and in foreign countries regulating the hours of labor for women,
together with extracts from more than ninety reports of various
committees, bureaus of statistics, and commissioners of hygiene to
show the deleterious effect upon women and upon society of prolonged hours of labor. In declaring the law constitutional Mr. Justice BREWtR who delivered the opinion for a unanimous court
said, "it is the peculiar value of the written constitution that it
places in unchanging form limitations upon legislative action and
thus gives permanence and stability to popular government which
would otherwise be lacking. At the same time, when a question of
fact is debated and debatable, and the extent to which a constitutional limitation goes is affected by the truth in respect to that fact,
a widespread and long continued belief concerning it is worthy of
consideration. We take judicial cognizance of matters of general
knowledge." (The italics are not the Court's.) In the more recent case of Bunting v. Oregon,42 the United States Supreme Court
again decided in favor of the validity of a ten-hour law for men,
intimating that whether it was necessary for the preservation of
health was a question for the state legislature and the state supreme
court, when the record contains no facts to support the contrary intention. It may be seen by a review of these cases that our courts
have declared that a sociological interpretation of law is constitutional and legal, although it seems that no court has used the term
"sociological," which is taboo with many of our conservative lawyers.
It is not necessary to determine how far the courts have gone in
their delimitation of the interpretative function of the legislature
40 Session Laws, 1903, p. 148.
"Muller v. Oregon, (1907), 208 U. S. 412.
42 Bunting v. Oregon, 0xg6), z43 U. S. 426.

It

should be noted that although there

was no dissent in Muller v. Oregon, in the later case three judges out of eight dissent.
Cf. ante, note 4.
"

Freund, Police Power. See. 3.
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and of the court in order to prove the validity of this method of
interpretation. If we are dealing with a constitutional question we
need ask only whether the legislature may interpret a constitutional
provision not alone by reference to the meaning of the words and
the intent of the framers of the constitution at the time the constitution is made, but also whether we may appeal to the social environment and needs at the time the legislation is adopted. When
the courts are interpreting a statute they must consider not only the
meaning of its words and the intention of the legislators at the time
the statute was passed but also whether it is within the competence
of the court to appeal to the social environment at the time of the
application of the statute.
In the case of Ritchie v. Illinois, supra,the court reached the conclusion that an eight-hour law for women was contrary to the
Fourteenth Amendment and to the similar provision in the Illinois Constitution, and refused to invoke the "police power" in order
to save the statute, because the rights of person and property cannot be invaded under the guise of a police regulation. In the later
Illinois case, Ritchie v. Waynuan, supra, a ten-hour law for women
was declared constitutional as a valid and legitimate exercise of the
police power of the State. The ten-hour law for bakers was declared
valid by the New York Court (People v. Lochner, supra) as a
proper exercise of the police power and the same law was declared
invalid by the United States Supreme Court (Lochner v. New
York, supra) because it was not a legitimate exercise of the police
power. The significant feature of all these decisions for our purused as the test of validity in
pose is that the "police power" was
4
police power [is] not *
"'the
says,
Freund
But
every instance.
of social, economic
expression
the
[is]
but
quantity
fixed
a
*
* *
vary, the poconditions
these
as
long
As
conditions.
political
and
development."
lice power must continue to be elastic, i. e., capable of
The Ohio Supreme Court says "The authority to ascertain facts,
and apply the law to the facts when ascertained, pertains 4as well
to.other departments of government as to the judiciary." The
United State Supreme Court has decided that "whether or not a
state has ceased to be republican in form, within the meaning of the
guaranty of the U. S. Const. art. 4, s.4, because it has made the
referendum a part of the legislative power, is not a judicial questton but a political one, which is solely for Congress to determine."" 5 The Court thus declares that when the legislative departState ex rel. v. Harmon, (1877), 31 Oh. St. 259. Cf. 147 Wis. 349.
4
"The
" Cf. Ohio ex reL. Davis v. Hildebrant, (1916), 241 W. S. S65.
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ment has exercised its interpretative power on the word "republican," the judicial department will not change the conclusion.
There seems little reason to doubt that the legislative branch in
interpreting the term has actually followed the sociological method.
The word, "republican," grammatically means "representative"
form of government and not a primary democracy, and no one can
read the discussions of the subject at the time the Constitution was
adopted without being convinced that the framers of that instrument intended to form a representative republic, not a pure democracy. The "police power," then, and the determination of its applicability belongs both to the legislatures and the courts, but the
invocation and application of the "police power" is nothing more
than an appeal to the sociological method of interpretatin of our
constitutions and laws.
That the courts have at last reached this theory of interpretation is somewhat obscured by the way in which the cases are reported. Mr. Justice HoIiEs does state the theory clearly and
concisely in Lochner v. New York, supra, but unfortunately this
is in a dissenting opinion. The "[in] articulate major premise" to
which he refers is the dominant sociological interpretation of the
word "liberty" at the time of the enforcement of the law and not
the grammatical interpretation of the word nor the "intention" of
the framers of the amendment to the constitution. He says, "The
Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics," and further, "Every opinion tends to become a law.
I think that the word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is perverted when it is held to prevent the-natural outcome of a dominant
opinion."4 6 When the doctrine was finally adopted into our law,
the "inarticulate major premise" of Mr. Justice HoLMEs was relegated to a foot-note' in the opinion, but it was the very elaborate
and convincing report, in this note by Mr. Brandeis, as to the
social and economic influence of long hours of labor for women,
in regard to which the court said, "We take judicial cognizance of
all matters of general knowledge." Referring to the note of Mr.
Brandeis' the court says: "The legislation and opinions referred
to in the margin may not be, technically speaking, authorities, and
in them is little or no discussion of the constitutional question presented to us for determination, yet they are significant of a widespread belief that woman's physical structure, and the functions
she performs in consequence thereof, justify special legislation re3198 U. S. 75.
U. S. 419.
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stricting or qualifying the conditions under which she should be
permitted to toil."
We may then conclude that sociological jurisprudence, at least so
far as it affects interpretation, is not borrowed from the "philosophy of the German Socialists." In the form of freedom of judicial decisions it has existed in Roman law from the classical period,
at least, and has re-appeared in slightly changed form in all the
modern derivatives of Roman law. It has also existed from the
earliest times in our own Common Law and has finally been made
both legal and constitutional by adoption in our highest courts, and
this too not as a borrowing from an alien system but as a judicial
recognition of an imperative social need. If, along with our English jurists, we are afraid of the term metaphysics or philosophy we
may think of it as a science. If, as is the case with some American judges, we are frightened because of the likeness of the term
sociological to socialistic, we may well call it a rational and not a sociological jurisprudence; and if we want to get squarely onto a legal
and constitutional basis we may, since the late decisions in the
United States Supreme Court and in the courts of a number of our
states, think of it as due process of law; and at the same time comfort ourselves with the reflection that it is in accord with good public policy and a developing idea of justice. "When an eighteenth
century constitution forms the charter of liberty of a twentieth century government must its general provisions be construed and interpreted by an eighteenth century mind in the light of eighteenth century conditions and ideals" asks Mr. Justice WINSLOW, of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, and we may answer as does he, "Surely
not. This were to command the race to halt in its 48progress, to
stretch the state upon a veritable bed of Procrustes."'
It may then be properly said, not only that a sociological interpretation of law is legal and constitutional, even under our own judicial
system with its rigid limitations on the powers of the judiciary and
the legislature; but also that such a method of interpretation is apparently inevitable in every system and at all times whenever the
law has reached the stage at which its development is entrusted to
a class of legal experts. This conclusion ought to be equally acceptable to the philosophical jurist or student of comparative law, whose
only purpose is to make the law more rational and more just; to
the judge, whose sole business it is to decide cases and decide them
right; but particularly to the scholarly lawyer who, like the old
Roman jurisconsult, may thereby make his influence felt in the
43Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327.
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scientific development of our law. A juridical process that has been
endorsed and adopted by Gaius and Justinian, by Bartolus and the
Humanists, by English Justices of the King's Bench and Chancellors in Equity, by Continental jurists and American legalists and
finally by Justice HoLms, Justice BREWDR and the United States
Supreme Bench can hardly be waived aside as the academic vaporings of professorial theorists. It would seem rather to be a part
of the much lauded "Natural Law" or of what is called in modem
phraseology, philosophic justice.
JosXPH H. DRAxx,
University of Michigan.

